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A.

I.

INTRODUCTION

It is an honor to be invited to write on Professor Hillman's iconic
article on contract lore.' Professor Hillman's original article, 2 and his

C) 2020 Cohn P. Marks. Ernest W. Clemens Professor of Law, St. Mary's
*
University School of Law. I would like to thank and acknowledge the hard work and
contributions of my research assistants Lucie Arvallo, Dominic Castillo, Lance Kimbro, Emily
Reed, Katherine Spiser, and Diana Valdez in researching and writing this Article. I would also
like to thank my wife Jill, daughter Savannah, and son George for their love and support.
Finally, I would like to thank Tulane Law School for hosting the 2019 International Conference
on Contract Law, and particularly Mark Wessman for his spectacular job in organizing the
event, and the Tulane Law Review for inviting me to publish this piece.
Robert A. Hillman, ContractLore, 27 J. CoRP. L. 505 (2002) [hereinafter Hillman,
1.
Lore 1].
See id.
2.

925

926
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follow-up,' asks contracts scholars and experts (collectively "contracts
people") to question the very foundations of what we seemingly all
accept as true.4 In what he labels "contract lore," contracts people are
perpetuating myths about the true state of contract law and the realities
of what actually happens.5 To explain this, Professor Hillman
hypothesizes that contract lore may represent the aspirations of
contracts people as to what the law should be and that our persistent
recitation of this lore can be explained as a form of cognitive
dissonance.6 In More Contract Lore, Professor Hillman admits that
there may be other explanations, but cognitive dissonance remains the
primary explanation.'
Respectfully, I disagree with Professor Hillman that all of the
examples he gives are "lore," or at least I think that the term is scalable.
Some of the instances, such as the importance of the intent of the
parties, I would label as more truth than myth, but other instances, such
as expectation damages putting the aggrieved party in the position they
would have been absent a breach, I think are unquestionably myths.
Similarly, I find that these statements of lore really reflect the ambitions
of what the law should be in the mind of contracts people not
completely convincing, but also scalable. Interestingly, these appear to
have an inverse relationship with the lore scale-thus the lore I find to
be the most aspirational, the importance of the intent of the parties, is
also the least lore-like, and vice versa with regard to expectation
damages. As I do not find all of the examples to fit neatly into lore or
aspirations, I find cognitive dissonance unsatisfying as an explanation
for the persistence of this lore, but that does not mean I disagree with
the observations about this telling us something about law reform.
Indeed, I think Professor Hillman has provided us with a useful device
by which to judge whether the law is in need of reform. A statement of
law that is high on the lore scale, but low on the aspiration scale, should
cause all contracts people to question the value of the statement, but I
don't think cognitive dissonance is a satisfactory explanation for all of
the lore Professor Hillman lists.
Instead, I propose that what Professor Hillman labels as lore is
better thought of as a series of heuristic starting points. I do not label
3.

See Robert A. Hillman, More Contract Lore, 94 TUL. L. REv. 903 (2020)

[hereinafter Hillman, Lore II].
4.
See Hillman,Lore I, supra note 1, at 505.

5.
6.
7.

Id.
Id. at 515-17.
See Hillman, Lore II, supra note 3, at 914.
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them heuristics in and of themselves as they do not represent shortcuts
to the ultimate answer. But as I explain, all of the areas that Professor
Hillman identifies as lore are actually quite nuanced, sometimes filled
with exceptions, but other times they simply represent the first step in
a long inquiry. Heuristics as a teaching device has been recognized in
law and other disciplines as an effective tool in not only conveying
information, but also prodding the student to conduct further inquiry.
Thus, the persistence of lore may reflect nothing more than the need to
have a starting point for a legal analysis, be it by a student, lawyer, or
judge.
II.

LORE, ASPIRATION, OR SOMETHING ELSE

Many of Hillman's observations are well-known to contracts
people. Professor Hillman asserts that these are examples of contract
lore in that they do not comport with what really happens, thus calling
into question why those familiar with contract law keep saying them.'
His conclusion is that these are primarily statements of aspirations and
that cognitive dissonance can explain why contracts people keep
restating these obvious false statements of law.9 While I agree that
many of these observations represent some degree of "loreness," each
observation is more complicated than implied by simply labeling them
all lore. Below I examine the "loreness" of each observation, placing
them on a spectrum of least-to-most lore-like.
A.

Intent of the Parties

1.

Objective Theory Is Always Taught as the Manifestation of
Intent

Hillman asserts that it is lore that we primarily care about the
intentions of the parties in contract formation and interpretation, but I
disagree with him in so far as he labels this "lore."" It is true that this
may be an aspiration-we think contract formation should be based on
the intent of the parties, but none of us are psychic. In an ideal world,
juries would be able to look into the hearts and minds of the litigants
and know what the agreed upon meaning of contract terms are at the
time the contract was made. But given humanity's lack of extrasensory
perception, we must rely on evidence of intent.
8.
9.
10.

Hillman, Lore I, supra note 1, at 505.
Id at 515-17.
Id. at 505-06, 511.
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Many basic rules of contract law are, therefore, built upon the
objective theory of contract. This is not a new phenomenon: as Oliver
Wendell Holmes noted in 1881, "The law has nothing to do with the
actual state of the parties' minds. In contract, as elsewhere, it must go
by externals, and judge parties by their conduct."" This has been true
in contract formation and interpretation as embodied by the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. On formation, section 17 states:
"(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the formation of a contract
requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to
the exchange and a consideration." 12 Section 200 defines interpretation
of a promise as being "the ascertainment of its meaning," 3 and in the
comments notes that, just as with formation "the intention of a party
that is relevant ... is the intention manifested by him rather than any
different undisclosed intention."l 4
Perhaps the most famous example of the intentions of the parties
not controlling is the iconic and beloved case ofLucy v. Zehmer. " Lucy
wished to purchase Zehmer's farm, but Zehmer had refused on
previous occasions.16 Then, one night after both men had imbibed quite
a few drinks, Lucy asserted that Zehmer wouldn't even take $50,000
for the farm.17 Zehmer apparently decided to play along and asserted
he would, and the two men drew up a makeshift contract on a guest
check that read, "We hereby agree to sell to W. 0. Lucy the Ferguson
Farm complete for $50,000.00, title satisfactory to buyer."" Zehmer
had his wife also sign the guest check but told her out of Lucy's earshot
that it was just a joke." When Lucy later attempted to enforce the
contract, the Zehmers argued in court that they were only joking and
that the contract should not be enforced.2 0 On appeal, the court
disagreed, finding that though the Zehmers may have intended the offer
as a joke, the court held that it "must look to the outward expression of
11.

O.W.

HOLMES, JR., THE COMMONLAw

309 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1881);

see also ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAw 46 (4th ed. 2019) ("[U]nder the

objective test of assent, contract law generally enforces the apparent, not necessarily real
intention of the promisor.").
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (emphasis
12.
added).
13. Id. § 200.
14. Id. § 200 cmt. b.
See 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954).
15.
16. Id. at 518.
17. Id. at 518-19.
18. Id. at 517-18.
See id at 519, 522.
19.
20. Id. at 517, 520.
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a person as manifesting his intention rather than to his secret and
unexpressed intention."21 As the written guest check suggested a
serious business transaction with no outward signs that it was intended
in jest, the court held that the Zehmers were bound by the agreement.22
The case of Lucy v. Zehmer is taught throughout the country to
first year law students as a warning that it is the manifestation of intent
that controls under the objective theory. That the case has achieved such
iconic status in contract lore would suggest that every serious contracts
person knows that the intention of the parties is not controlling. Thus,
the "lore" that we care about the intention of the parties isn't really the
lore at all. I would suggest that instead, what is lore is the primacy of
the written expression over the actual intentions of the parties.
2.

Intent Is Only an Issue when Parties Disagree

The above is not meant to imply that intent is irrelevant. Quite the
contrary, we use the objective theory and the manifestations of intent
to glean what the intent of the parties actually is. Even when the
objective evidence seems to point to a serious contract being formed,
if both parties agree that the contract is a joke, then neither party would
be bound. For instance, if Lucy had known from the context that the
two of them were just speaking in jest, even the staunchest objectivist
would not bind the two parties.23
Further, intent means a great deal to the parties at issue and
frequently contracts do embody the intent of the parties. It is only when
the parties disagree as to whether a contract is formed or what a term
means that we must engage in the exercise of determining intent based
upon the objective evidence available. The offer-acceptance model is a
good example of the role intent plays.
The Restatement standard for "[a]n offer is the manifestation of
willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person
in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will
conclude it." 24 Intent is seen in the word "willingness," but as already
21. Id at 521-23 (quoting First Nat. Exch. Bank of Roanoke v. Roanoke Oil Co., 192
S.E. 764, 770 (Va. 1937)).
22. Id. at 521-22.
23. See id at 522-23; see also Kolodziej v. Mason, 774 F.3d 736, 745 (11th Cir. 2014)
("Under the objective standard of assent, we do not look into the subjective minds of the
parties; the law imputes an intention that corresponds with the reasonable meaning of a party's
words and acts.").
24.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 24 (AM.

LAW INST. 1981); see also In

re First Capital Life Ins. Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 816, 818-20 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding where a

930
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noted, this is modified by the word "manifestation." Acceptance of an
offer, the Restatement tells us, "is a manifestation of assent to the terms
thereof made by the offeree in a manner invited or required by the
offer." 25 Intent is expressed by use of the word "assent" again modified
with "manifestation." The clearest case would be where the objective
manifestations match-up with the parties' intent, such as with a clear
written offer and reciprocal and unequivocal acceptance. But when the
communications are less than clear, courts must discern the intentions
of the parties and whether they intended to be bound to one another. A
26
frequent fact pattern that arises involves price quotations.
27
Typically, price quotations are not offers, but they can, in some
circumstances, rise to the level of an offer if the quote is specific, uses

letter sent in error, if a reasonable person believes that the offeror manifested a willingness to
be bound and a mode for the offeree to accept, can constitute "an offer to continue a contract");
Eagle Force Holdings, LLC v. Campbell, 187 A.3d 1209, 1229-30 (Del. 2018) ('I]n applying
th[e] objective test for determining whether the parties intended to be bound, the court reviews
the evidence that the parties communicated to each other up until the time that the contract was
signed-i.e., their words and actions-including the putative contract itself."); City of Houston
v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 144 (Tex. 2011) (holding that a statute could be incorporated by
reference into a contract if "sufficient manifestation of an intent to be contractually bound' is
made by a municipality in a manner that communicates an offer).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50; see also In re Cranberry Growers
25.
Coop., 588 B.R. 50, 55 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2018) (holding where an offeree makes a
manifestation of assent to be bound to a binding and enforceable contract, the terms in the
contract are controlling).
26. Nordyne, Inc. v. Int'l Controls & Measurements Corp., 262 F.3d 843, 846 (8th Cir.
2001) (explaining that factors used to determine if "a price quotation is an offer include the
extent of prior inquiry, the completeness of the terms of the suggested bargain, and the number
of persons to whom the price quotation is communicated" (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

CONTRACTS § 26 cmt. c)). In this case the offeror had sent a price quote after many months of
negotiation. Id The quote included price, quantity, time to accept, and requested a signature of
acceptance. Id The offeree's argument that because the quote lacked definite quantity it was
not a quote was rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit based on
the performance of each party in honoring the terms of the quote up until the dispute. Id at
846-47; see also RPTS, Inc. v. FMC Tubular & Equip. Corp., Nos. 11 CA0001-M, 1 1CA0018M, 2012 WL 366876, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012) ("[T]he determination of the issue depends
primarily upon the intention of the person communicating the quotation as demonstrated by all
of the surrounding facts and circumstances." (quoting Dyno Constr. Co. v. McWane, Inc., 198
F.3d 567, 572 (6th Cir. 1999))); Beaver Valley Alloy Foundry, Co. v. Therma-Fab, Inc., 814
A.2d 217, 222-23 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (discussing the factors that caused a price quote to rise
to the level of an offer that included an unequivocal quotation, definite terms, and other actions
that constituted an objective manifestation of assent).
27. See J.D. Fields & Co. v. U.S. Steel Int'l, Inc., 426 F. App'x 271, 276 (5th Cir.
2011) ("Generally, a price quotation .. . is not considered an offer, rather, it is typically viewed
as an invitation to offer."); White Consol. Indus. v. McGill Mfg. Co., 165 F.3d 1185, 1190 (8th
Cir. 1999) ("Typically, a price quotation is considered an invitation for an offer, rather than an
offer to form a binding contract.").
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unequivocal language, and makes clear how to accept.28 When a price
quote is given, a purchase order follows, and then performance, the
question may arise as to whether the price quote is an offer accepted by
the subsequent purchase order, or if it is truly a solicitation of an order,
in which case the purchase order is the offer accepted by conduct. 29 The
resolution of the question is often key in resolving issues such as the
scope and extent of warranties and limitations on damages."o In
resolving such issues, courts frequently look to the context of the
negotiations to glean the intent of the parties.'
Furthermore, intention is highly relevant where silence is being
used as the mode of acceptance. Generally, silence or inaction cannot
form the basis of a valid acceptance, but exceptions do exist.3 2 For
instance, accepting "the benefit[s] of [a] service[] with reasonable
opportunity to reject them and reason to know that they were offered
28.

See ID. Fields & Co., 426 F. App'x at 278 (noting that courts have found price

quotes rising to the level of offers if it is detailed enough, does not limit acceptance, and
contains specific, material terms); Nordyne, 262 F.3d at 846 ("Factors relevant in determining
whether a price quotation is an offer include the extent of prior inquiry, the completeness of
the terms of the suggested bargain, and the number of persons to whom the price quotation is
communicated." (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 26 cmt. c)).

29. See Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Hitachi Am., Ltd., 406 F. Supp. 2d 819, 830 (N.D.
Ohio 2005) (finding that the price quotations sent over a long series of negotiations were not
offers; instead the purchase order was the offer and subsequent acceptance was evidenced by

shipping goods).
30.
See, e.g., id. at 830-32 (looking to the purchase order to determine which warranties
apply and finding the purchase orders incorporate by reference some of the warranties
documented in prior negotiations).

31. See, e.g., Mead Corp. v. McNally-Pittsburg Mfg. Corp., 654 F.2d 1197, 1200-04
(6th Cir. 1981) (finding a bid proposal was an offer based on the oral negotiations that showed
the intention of the parties to be bound); Babcock & Wilcox Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 828
(holding that a court's main focus when determining a price quote rising to the level of an offer,
should be a focus on the intention of the parties based on a totality of the circumstances); All.

Laundry Sys. LLC v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 763 N.W.2d 167 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008) (reversing
and remanding a case to the fact finder to determine the intent of the parties where both the
price quotation and the purchase order were deficient to constitute as a matter of law an offer
in order to determine warranty terms).

32.

See Bauer v. Qwest Commc'ns Co., 743 F.3d 221, 229-30 (7th Cir. 2014)

(affirming that despite the lack of a required signature for a settlement agreement, the conduct
and failure to respond to a document that stated silence was acceptance of a final agreement, a

party was bound by the agreement); White v. Nat'l Football League, 92 F. Supp. 2d 918, 920,
924 (D. Minn. 2000) (holding that where an agent of an NFL player silently reaps the benefits

of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), they are bound by the obligations imposed
under the CBA); Vogt v. Madden, 713 P.2d 442, 444-45 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (applying the
two silence as acceptance exceptions under section 69 of Restatement (Second) of Contracts:
"those where the offeree silently takes offered benefits, and those where one party relies on the
other party's manifestation of intention that silence may operate as acceptance" (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§

69 cmt. a)).
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33
with the expectation of compensation" will qualify as an acceptance.
This would seem to be based on the fact that by staying silent the
4
offeree intended to form a contract.3 Section 69 of the Restatement
lays out intent as a specific way to accept by silence, stating there is
acceptance "[w]here the offeror has stated or given the offeree reason
to understand that assent may be manifested by silence or inaction, and
the offeree in remaining silent and inactive intends to accept the
offer."3 5 Of course, proving intent will still be an issue, but once again
we see a standard that turns on the intention of the parties.
In a similar vein, preliminary agreements raise issues of intent.
Two parties may enter into negotiations, sometimes over an extended
period of time. Both parties may even move forward as if there is a
contract, even though the final writing is still forthcoming. In such
situations, when the relationship breaks down prior to this final writing,
courts must decide if the parties have nonetheless bound themselves to
a contract. In doing so, courts consider factors such as "whether there
not to be bound," part
[has been] an express reservation ...
performance, "whether all of the [relevant] terms . .. have been agreed
upon," the context, and whether it is typical for a further writing to be
entered into.3 6 All of these factors, however, are really just ways of

33.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 69(l)(a); see also Weichert

Co. Realtors

v. Ryan, 608 A.2d 280, 285 (N.J. 1992) ("[C]ourts have held that when an offeree accepts the

offeror's services without expressing any objection to the offer's essential terms, the offeree
has manifested assent to those terms.").
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 cmt. c ("The mere fact that an
34.

offeror states that silence will constitute acceptance does not deprive the offeree of his privilege

to remain silent without accepting. But the offeree is entitled to rely on such a statement if he

chooses."); see also Walshe v. Zabors, 178 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 1081-82 (D. Colo. 2016) (holding
for the purposes of surviving summary judgment that conduct by one party could support an
implied contract to create a partnership based on evidence the party took advantages ofbenefits
outside of an express employment contract).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69(1)(b); see also James v. Glob.
35.

TelLink Corp, 852 F.3d 262, 266 (3d Cir. 2017) ("'Silence does not ordinarily manifest assent,
but the relationships between the parties or other circumstances may justify the offeror's
expecting a reply and, therefore, assuming that silence indicates assent to the proposal.'
Nevertheless, the offeror must 'give[] the offeree reason to understand that assent may be
manifested by silence or inaction."' (citation omitted) (first quoting Weichert Co. Realtors, 608
A.2d at 284; and then quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69(1)(b))); Lexington

Ins. Co. v. Lindahl Constr. & Eng'g, Inc., 47 P.3d 1081, 1086-87, 1087 n.15 (Alaska 2002)
("We have also held that silence operates as acceptance of an agreement only in cases where a

party has 'reason to understand that assent may be manifested by silence. . ., and the [party] in
remaining silent .. .intends to accept the offer."' (quoting Brady v. State, 965 P.2d 1, 9 (Alaska

1998))).
36.

See Brown v. Cara, 420 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2005) ("There are four factors

relevant to determining whether a preliminary agreement is enforceable as to the 'ultimate
contractual objective': (1) whether there is an expressed reservation of the right not to be bound
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helping the court determine the only thing that matters in such a
situation-did the parties intend to be bound to one another in
contract. 37
3.

Contextual Approach to Contract Interpretation Recognizes the
Harshness of a Strict Objective View

Too strict an adherence to the written document has spurred
concerns that injustices may be perpetuated under the objective theory
of contract. Thus, the objective theory asks not what a detached
reasonable person would think a contract means, but what a reasonable
person in the same situation would think.3 8 Similarly, the parole
evidence rule allows in contextual evidence when the judge finds the
contract to be partially integrated or ambiguous, and in some
jurisdictions, the court will invite such contextual evidence as part of
its deliberation on the issue of ambiguity and integration. 39 As Chief

in the absence of a writing; (2) whether there has been partial performance of the contract;
(3) whether all of the terms of the alleged contract have been agreed upon; and (4) whether the
agreement at issue is the type of contract that is usually committed to writing."); Burbach
Broad. Co. v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 408 (4th Cir. 2002) ("Among the
circumstances which may be helpful in determining whether this type of agreement has been
made are 1) whether there has been an express reservation of the right not to be bound in the
absence of a writing, 2) whether there has been partial performance of the contract, 3) whether
all of the terms of the alleged contract have been agreed upon, and 4) whether the agreement
at issue is the type of contract that is usually committed to writing."); Miller v. Flegenheimer,
161 A.3d 524,529 (Vt. 2016) ("[I]n the absence of a fully executed document, we apply a fourfactor test to determine whether parties intended to be bound: '(1) whether there has been an
express reservation of the right not to be bound in the absence of a writing; (2) whether there
has been partial performance of the contract; (3) whether all of the terms of the alleged contract
have been agreed upon; and (4) whether the agreement at issue is the type of contract that is
usually committed to writing."' (quoting Catamount Slate Prods., Inc. v. Sheldon, 845 A.2d
324, 329 (Vt. 2003))).
37. See Fairbrook Leasing, Inc. v. Mesaba Aviation, Inc., 408 F.3d 460, 465 (8th Cir.
2005) ("To assess whether the parties have demonstrated an intent to be bound by a Type I
agreement, a court considers (1) the language of the agreement; (2) the existence of open terms;
(3) whether there has been partial performance; and (4) whether the agreement is of the type
usually committed to writing." (quoting Fairbook Leasing, Inc. v. Mesaba Aviation, Inc., 295
F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1070 (D. Minn. 2003))); Jack Baker, Inc. v. Office Space Dev. Corp., 664
A.2d 1236, 1239 (D.C. 1995) ("[P]arties will not be bound to a preliminary agreement unless
the evidence presented clearly indicates that they intended to be bound at that point."); Cochran
v. Norkunas, 919 A.2d 700,708 (Md. 2007) ("Courts and commentators have identified several
factors that may be helpful in determining whether the parties have manifested an intention to
be bound.").
38.
See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641,
644 (Cal. 1968); Cochran, 919 A.2d at 710.
39.
See, e.g., Pac. Gas, 442 P.2d at 644.
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Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court noted in Pacific Gas
& Electric Co. v. G. W Thomas Drayage& Rigging Co.:
If words had absolute and constant referents, it might be possible to
discover contractual intention in the words themselves and in the manner
in which they were arranged. Words, however, do not have absolute and
constant referents.. . .Accordingly, the meaning of a writing "* * * can

only be found by interpretation in the light of all the circumstances that
reveal the sense in which the writer used the words. The exclusion of
parol evidence regarding such circumstances merely because the words
do not appear ambiguous to the reader can easily lead to the attribution
to a written instrument of a meaning that was never intended. . . ."
Although extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add to, detract
from, or vary the terms of a written contract, these terms must first be
determined before it can be decided whether or not extrinsic evidence is
being offered for a prohibited purpose. The fact that the terms of an
instrument appear clear to a judge does not preclude the possibility that
the parties chose the language of the instrument to express different
terms. 4 0
This approach has been embraced in many jurisdictions as a method of
determining the intention of the parties when words are used in a
contract.4 1 This approach is explicitly adopted in the comments to
section 2-202 of the U.C.C. as well, which states:
This section definitely rejects: . . . (b) The premise that the language used

has the meaning attributable to such language by rules of construction
existing in the law rather than the meaning which arises out of the
commercial context in which it was used; and (c) The requirement that a
condition precedent to the admissibility of the type of evidence specified
in paragraph (a) is an original determination by the court that the
language used is ambiguous.4 2
In sum, the lore surrounding the parties' intent is actually quite
complicated. At most, we have a starting assumption about intent,
followed by a method to discern intent that has been modified to reflect
that the objective theory is imperfect. But this does not mean we don't
give primacy to the parties' intent. Rather, it simply recognizes that
judges and juries are not mind readers and that contextual tools must
be used to discern intent.

40. Id. at 644-45 (quoting Universal Sales Corp. v. Cal. Press Mfg., 128 P.2d 665, 679
(Cal. 1942) (Traynor, J., concurring)).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
41.
42. U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (Purpose 1).

CONTRA CT LORE
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Willful Breach

While the lore of intent may not quite qualify as true lore,
Hillman's assertions about willful breach come closer to lore. It is
probably closer to true that contracts people believe that generally the
reason for the breach is irrelevant-if you breach a contract, you will
be liable.4 3 This is false if we take it to mean that willfulness is
irrelevant to the amount of damages, so perhaps this bit of lore is more
of a half-truth. It is generally true with regard to liability, but not
amount. Professor Hillman offers materiality as evidence of why
willfulness matters, which I expand on below.
1.

Materiality

Professor Hillman properly points to materiality as a concept
where willfulness is taken into account.' As noted in the Restatement:
§ 241 Circumstances Significant in Determining Whether a Failure Is
Material
In determining whether a failure to render or to offer performance is
material, the following circumstances are significant:
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the
benefit which he reasonably expected;
(b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately
compensated for the part of that benefit of which he will be deprived;
(c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to
perform will suffer forfeiture;
(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to
perform will cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstances
including any reasonable assurances;
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform
or to offer to perform comports with standards of goodfaith andfair
45

dealing.

While good faith and fair dealing are not necessarily equated with
willfulness, an intentional breach would seem to fail to meet this
standard. 46
43.

See Hillman, Lore I, supra note 1, at 506, 509.

44. See id. at 509 & n.9.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (emphasis added).
46. See Designer Direct, Inc. v. DeForest Redev. Auth., 313 F.3d 1036, 1046-47 (7th
Cir. 2002) ("Wisconsin law defines good-faith conduct in the negative: 'Subterfuges and
evasions violate the obligation of good faith in performance even though the actor believes his
conduct to be justified. But the obligation goes further: bad faith may be overt or may consist
of inaction, and fair dealing may require more than honesty. A complete catalogue of types of

936

TULANE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 94:925

If a breach is intentional, there could be an effect on the damages.
To understand why, we must consider what the breaching party is
entitled to in a situation in which a breach is material versus a case of
substantial performance. In a material breach situation, the breaching
party is not entitled to recover the contractually agreed upon amount,47
and in some jurisdictions is precluded to any recovery at all,48 though
bad faith is impossible, but the following types are among those which have been recognized
in judicial decisions: evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off,
willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a power to specify terms, and interference
with or failure to cooperate in the other party's performance."' (quoting Foseid v. State Bank
of Cross Plains, 541 N.W.2d 203, 213 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995))); First Interstate Bank of Idaho v.
Small Bus. Admin., 868 F.2d 340, 344 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The bank's covert evasion of its
bargained-for performance failed completely to comport with 'standards of good faith and fair
dealing' as we understand them." (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241(e))).
In FirstInterstateBank ofldaho v. Small Business Administration,
[t]he bank, specifically [one ofj its officer[s], attempted twice to persuade the [Small
Business Association] to guarantee a paydown of its large existing loans ...
replacing overdue nonguaranteed loans with [Small Business Association]guaranteed ones. Not succeeding in this effort, the bank tried to do covertly and
illegally, in the amount of approximately $115,000, what it could not do legally; use
a government loan program to insure its past bad loans.
Id. at 343. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit employed section 241 of
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts to analyze the materiality of the bank's breach of its
guarantee agreement with the SBA, found the bank's conduct to be in violation of the standards
of good faith and fair dealing, and eventually held the bank substantially breached the
guarantee agreement. Id. at 340, 344, 348 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 241).
47. See New Windsor Volunteer Ambulance Corps. v. Meyers, 442 F.3d 101, 118 (2d
Cir. 2006) ("In the event that the breaching party is entitled to recover on such an unjust
enrichment theory, the amount to which he is entitled is measured not by the contract price but
rather by 'the reasonable value of services rendered."' (quoting Longo v. Shore & Reich, Ltd.,
25 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1994))); Am. Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. v. St. Joseph Valley Bank, 391
N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) ("A breaching party may recover, apart from the contract,
in quantum meruit."); Iota Mgmt. Corp. v. Boulevard Inv. Co., 731 S.W.2d 399, 417 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987) ("In cases of quantum meruit recovery, the breaching party of a contract is required
to return to the injured party the reasonable value of work and labor furnished while the contract
was sought to be performed."); ARC LifeMed, Inc. v. AMC-Tenn., Inc., 183 S.W.3d 1, 25
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) ("A party who has materially breached a contract cannot recover on the
contract. Nevertheless, under proper conditions and upon carrying the burden of proof as to the
value of services rendered under the contract, he may recover in quantum meruit. The rule is:
'Even though a contract be entire, the party who breaches the same may recover of the other
party, as on a quantum merit, the value of benefits conferred on such other party by partial
performance-these benefits being accepted and retained. Any damage, of course, which the
party not in default suffered by the breach also to be taken into account."' (quoting Nat'l Life
& Accident Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 98 S.W.2d 107, 108 (Tenn. 1936))).
48. See, e.g., Stover v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 658 F. Supp. 156, 159-61 (S.D. W. Va.
1987); Diamonds & Denims, Inc. v. First of Ga. Ins. Co., 417 S.E.2d 440, 441-42 (Ga. Ct. App.
1992); DiFrancisco v. Chubb Ins. Co., 662 A.2d 1027, 1032-34 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1995); Levy v. Chubb Ins., 659 N.Y.S.2d 266, 266-68 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (precluding
recovery based on material breach of contract).
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other jurisdictions may still permit a recovery for restitution.4 9 In either
case, the breaching party is still liable for damages caused by the
breach." However, if there is substantial performance, though the
breaching party still owes damages, the breaching party does get the
contractually agreed upon amount."
To illustrate, consider the following simplified hypothetical.
Imagine a house builder who agrees to build a house for $250,000,
which takes into account the builder's expenses and a tidy little profit
margin. Due to an oversight, the completed house has no doors.
Assume that a house with no doors is only worth $100,000,52 but that

the problem can be fixed for $50,000. If the builder is found to have
materially breached the contract-an analysis that considers good faith
and fair dealing-then at most the builder could claim $100,000 as the
value conferred, but would still have to pay $50,000 in damages, thus
netting only $50,000. But if it is found that the contract has been
substantially performed, then the builder will be entitled to the full
$250,000 contract price, less the $50,000 to fix the problem, thus
netting $200,000. Therefore, if we accept that the concepts of good
faith and fair dealing take into account the reason for the breach, this
could make a difference of $150,000 to our hypothetical builder.
2.

Economic Waste

Related to the materiality inquiry is the defense that paying the
full sum of damages would be economically wasteful. The economic
waste doctrine was made famous by Judge Cardozo in the iconic case
of Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent.53 That case involved the construction
of a house that specified the pipe to be used throughout the house was
to be manufactured by Reading. 54 After completion of the house, it was
49. See Preferred Inv. Servs., Inc. v. T&H Bail Bonds, Inc., No. 5886VCP, 2013 WL
3934992, at *2, *25 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2013).
50. See Meyer v. Chieffo, 950 N.E.2d 1027 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011).
51. See Vance v. My Apartment Steak House of San Antonio, Inc., 677 S.W.2d 480,
481-83 (Tex. 1984) (noting the doctrine of substantial performance recognizes that the
contractor has breached the contract, but allows the breaching party to bring suit for the cost of
his completed work).
52. This is obviously a simplified hypothetical, meant to illustrate a point. I
acknowledge that an argument could be made that the value of the house is $200,000, but the
claim here must be made based on the value of what has been delivered to the buyer. If the
buyer can sell the house for no more than $100,000 without doors, then that is the value
conferred.
53. See 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921); Hal J. Perloff, The Economic-Waste Doctrine in
Government ContractLitigation,43 DEPAUL L. REv. 185, 188 (1993).
Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 890 (N.Y. 1921).
54.
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discovered that a substantial portion of the pipe was not of Reading
manufacture and the injured parties brought suit seeking the cost of
tearing out all existing pipe and replacing it with Reading." Note that
even if the contract was substantially performed, this would normally
be the correct measure of damages.5 6 Though it was found that the
wrong pipe was in fact used, Judge Cardozo denied the plaintiff the full
sum of replacement, finding that the defect was insignificant in relation
to the project, and that the breach "was neither fraudulent nor willful,"
but was rather due to "the oversight and inattention of' the
subcontractor." Instead, Judge Cardozo awarded the difference in
value of what was delivered and what was promised, which in the case
before him was nominal."
In summarizing the economic waste doctrine, Cardozo
highlighted the importance of the reason for the breach, stating:
This is merely to say that the law will be slow to impute the purpose, in
the silence of the parties, where the significance of the default is
grievously out of proportion to the oppression of the forfeiture. The
willful transgressor must accept the penalty of his transgression. For him
there is no occasion to mitigate the rigor of implied conditions. The
transgressor whose default is unintentional and trivial may hope for
mercy if he will offer atonement for his wrong.
In the circumstances of this case, we think the measure of the
allowance is not the cost of replacement, which would be great, but the
difference in value, which would be either nominal or nothing.59
The economic waste doctrine thus offers up another example where the
reason for the breach does not matter for liability but may have a rather
large impact on damages. Since its enunciation by Cardozo, courts
have continued to use the doctrine to limit recovery when the breach is
not willful.60

55. Id.
56. See id. at 890-92.
57. Id. at 890-91.
58. Id at 891-92.
59. Id. at 891 (citations omitted).
60. See Shell v. Schmidt, 330 P.2d 817, 823 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) ("[L]ack of
willfulness is a necessary component ... to 'trigger' the invoking of the value rule."); Perloff,
supranote 53, at 227 & n.315 ("[A] contractor cannot invoke the economic-waste doctrine if
breach of the contract specifications was willful or intentional.").
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Expectation Damages

The last example of contract lore provided in Professor Hillman's
original article is the myth that expectation damages will put the
aggrieved party in the same position as they would have been in had
the other party not breached.6 1 On this point I have to agree with
Professor Hillman that this is lore-expectation damages as a pure
contract remedy rarely if ever place the aggrieved party in the place
they would have been had the other party not breached as, among other
reasons, the cost of litigating the claim is not included in the recovery.
However, though expectation damages do not result in a full recovery,
this is an incomplete description of their utility.
Most contracts people understand that expectation damages are
but one of three possible interests that can be protected-the other two
being the reliance interest and the restitution interest. 62 Expectation
damages are usually sought as they normally represent the highest
recovery amount and thus act as a good starting point for evaluating a
claim.6 3 However, there are instances where the reliance measure or
restitution will result in a higher recovery, especially if the expectation
damages are speculative.' In such an instance, the plaintiff may be
better off recovering amounts expended in reliance on the contract,
rather than the expectation interest. Of course, this claim suffers the
same weakness in that it is lore-the plaintiff still must pay attorney's
61.
62.

See Hillman, Lore I, supra note 1, at 505-09.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).

63.

See Ins. Brokers W., Inc. v. Liquid Outcome, LLC, 874 F.3d 294, 298 (1st Cir.

2017) ("Under Rhode Island law, the traditional measure of damages in an action for breach
of contract is the amount that 'will serve to put the injured party as close as is reasonably
possible to the position he would have been in had the contract been fully performed."'

(quoting George v. George F. Berkander, Inc., 169 A.2d 370, 372 (R.I. 1961))); VICI Racing,
LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 697, 699 (D. Del. 2015) ("Contract damages 'are
designed to place the injured party in an action for breach of contract in the same place as he
would have been if the contract had been performed.' (quoting Paul v. Deloitte & Touche,
LLP, 974 A.2d 140, 146 (Del. 2009))); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. a.

64.

See ATACS Corp. v. Trans World Commc'ns, Inc., 155 F.3d 659, 669 (3d Cir.

1998) (explaining the theory of reliance damages as "seeking to achieve the position that [the
injured party] would have obtained had the contract never been made, usually through the
recovery of expenditures actually made in performance or in anticipation of performance");

Boulevard Assocs. v. Sovereign Hotels, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 1132, 1138 (D. Conn. 1994)
(holding that where expectation damages were entirely too speculative, a party could receive
reliance damages based on part performance of the contract); Fid. Fund, Inc. v. Di Santo, 500

A.2d 431, 438-39 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) ("[Restitution is] the prevention of unjust enrichment
through the protection of his restitution interest. . . . [T]he courts must weigh several factors,
including the materiality of the breach, by the party seeking restitution ... and whether the
forfeiture is disproportionate to the benefit to be received by the party against whom restitution
is claimed." (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)).
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fees and go through the hassle of litigating just to be repaid. But the
availability of reliance damages demonstrates that expectation
damages are not really all contracts people think of when they think of
remedies.
Interestingly, though restitution is often thought of as the least
attractive option for a remedy, under the right circumstances a claim in
restitution may require the defendant to disgorge profits well in excess
of any contemplated sum for expectation damages.6 5 Such was the case
in EarthInfo, Inc. v. Hydrosphere Resource Consultants, Inc., which
involved the breach of a license by failure of the defendant to pay
royalties.6 6 In that case, Hydrosphere had developed software enabling
its users to access hydrological and meteorological information.6 7
EarthInfo acquired rights to this software under a royalty agreement
that required EarthInfo to pay Hydrosphere a percentage of net sales
for products developed by Hydrosphere. 68 A dispute arose as to whether
newly developed derivative products were included in the royalties,
and EarthInfo subsequently quit paying royalties altogether, in breach
of the contract. 69 The trial court found for Hydrosphere, rescinded the
contract, and ordered EarthInfo to pay over to Hydrosphere its net
profits from the use of the software.7 0 On appeal, the court agreed that
disgorgement was a proper remedy "taking into account the nature of
the defendant's wrong, the relative extent of his or her contribution, and
the feasibility of separating this from the contribution traceable to the
plaintiff's interest." 7 1
Two other types of recovery complicate the lore surrounding
remedies: emotional harm and punitives. Typically, neither are
65.
See Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S. 445, 463 (2015) (holding that disgorgement of
profits is warranted in situations where states make compacts that are breached with reckless
disregard of the other's rights); Dastgheib v. Genentech, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 2d 536, 538 (E.D.
Pa. 2006) (holding under North Carolina state law that where one party confers a benefit on
another that is not part of the contract the damaged party may seek disgorgement); Earthinfo,
Inc. v. Hydrosphere Res. Consultants, Inc., 900 P.2d 113, 118-19 (Colo. 1995) ("If, however,
the defendant's wrongdoing is intentional or substantial, or there are no other means of
measuring the wrongdoer's enrichment, recovery of profits may be granted.").
66.
EarthInfo, 900 P.2d at 115-16.
67.
Id.
68.
Id. at 116.
69.
Id
70.
Id at 116-17, 120.
71.
Id at 119 ("Thus, the more culpable the defendant's behavior, and the more direct
the connection between the profits and the wrongdoing, the more likely that the plaintiff can
recover all defendant's profits."). Though the court agreed that disgorgement was proper, it
remanded so that the trial court could make findings as to the relative contributions made by
EarthInfo. Id at 119, 121.
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available in a simple breach of contract case.72 However, in rare
instances, emotional harm may be recoverable when the likelihood of
emotional harm is particularly high given the nature of the contract.7 3
The paradigmatic cases involve funeral services. For instance, in Ross
v. Forest Lawn Memorial Park, a mother was permitted to recover
emotional distress damages from a funeral home that breached its
agreement to keep the funeral private.74 The deceased daughter was a
"punk rocker" and the mother "was fearful that her daughter's former
associates would disrupt the private services."7 5 These fears proved
well-founded as the court colorfully described the funeral scene as
follows:
Many punk rockers attended both the funeral services in the chapel
and the grave-site burial services. Neither their appearance nor
comportment was in accord with traditional, solemn funeral ceremonies.
Some were in white face makeup and black lipstick. Hair colors ranged
from blues and greens to pinks and oranges. Some were dressed in
leather and chains and twirled baton-like weapons, while yet another
wore a dress decorated with live rats. The uninvited guests were drinking
and using cocaine, and were physically and verbally abusive to family
members and their guests. A disturbance ensued and grew to the point
that police had to be called to restore order.76
The court held that emotional distress damages were compensable for
a breach of contract as "[t]he contract was a lawful contract which by
its nature put respondent on notice that a breach would result in
emotional and mental suffering by appellant."" In a similar vein,
emotional harm damages have been recognized for breach of contract
in other contexts where the likelihood of emotional harm flowing from
a breach was particularly high." Though this still falls under the lore of
72. See Miller Brewing Co. v. Best Beers of Bloomington, Inc. 608 N.E.2d 975, 981
(Ind. 1993) ("Opinions of this Court have consistently stated the general rule that punitive
damages are not allowed in a breach of contract action."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 353 cmt. a, 355 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("Damages for emotional
disturbance are not ordinarily allowed.").
73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §353.
74. 203 Cal. Rptr. 468,470-73 (Ct. App. 1984).
75. Id. at 470.
76. Id.
77. Id at 473.
78. See Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary Ass'n, 17 P.2d 535, 537 (Colo. 1932)
(recognizing action for breach of contract and damages for emotional distress arising out of
mortician's unauthorized use of decedent's image in advertising); Stewart v. Rudner, 84
N.W.2d 816, 824-27 (Mich. 1957) (affirming recovery of emotional distress damages for
breach of contract when physician's failure to perform Caesarean section as agreed resulted in
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expectancy damages, soft damages such as emotional harm tend to give
juries room to make higher awards than otherwise might be attained.7 9
Similar to emotional harm damages, punitives can compensate
victims of a breach beyond their normal expectancy damages but are
only available if there is an accompanying tort.so As fraud is both a
contract voidability defense and a tort, it is a frequent allegation in
breach of contract claims.8 In some instances, this may come in the
form of intent to perform at inception, but more frequently it comes in
the form of fraud in the inducement. Though some courts limit
punitives in a contract claim, even when fraud is involved, others are
more liberal in their permissiveness.8 2 Though this is due to the breach

stillbirth of the plaintiff s child); Menorah Chapels at Millbum v. Needle, 899 A.2d 316, 318,
324-36 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (reversing lower court's denial of recovery of
emotional distress damages for breach of contract when "funeral home that caters to members
of the Jewish faith [failed] to ensure that orthodox ritual requirements are met"); Stockdale v.
Baba, 795 N.E.2d 727, 743 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (allowing "recovery for emotional
disturbance" for breach of contract after finding any breach by defendant of his settlement
contract with two women, executed in relation with his prosecution for stalking, would likely
result in serious emotional distress to women).
See Stewart, 84 N.W.2d at 821, 823-27 (affirming award of $5000 for pain, mental
79.
suffering, and loss of wages due to doctor's breach of contract despite no other economic loss);
Flores v. Baca, 871 P.2d 962, 964, 967-68, 970 (N.M. 1994) (affirming award of $100,000 in
compensatory damages to wife of deceased for funeral home's breach of contract "to prepare
decedent's body and ... perform funeral and burial services" after finding that funeral home's
failure to properly embalm decedent's body caused wife emotional distress); Stockdale, 795
N.E.2d at 734 (allowing each plaintiff to recover $10,000 in emotional distress damages for
breach of settlement contract when the breach caused no actual economic loss).
80.
See Ginsberg v. Gamson, 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 62, 80 (Ct. App. 2012).
81.
See, e.g., Henderson v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 620 F.2d 530, 536 (5th Cir. 1980);
Clark v. Aenchbacher, 238 S.E.2d 442, 444 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977).
82.
Compare Ginsberg, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 80 ("Tort liability is a necessary predicate for
punitive damages. Punitive damages may not be awarded as relief in a breach of contract
claim."), and Miller Brewing Co. v. Best Beers of Bloomington, Inc., 608 N.E.2d 975, 981
(Ind. 1993) ("Opinions of this Court have consistently stated the general rule that punitive
damages are not allowed in a breach of contract action. Such statements suggest that there are
exceptions to this rule, but upon close examination of the opinions of this Court, we find that
no exceptions have ever been applied. Today we hold that, in fact, no exception exists."
(citations omitted)), with Henderson, 620 F.2d at 536 ("Under Mississippi law, punitive
damages can, within limits, be assessed for breach of contract. The act giving rise to punitive
damages must be 'a willful and intentional wrong, or . . such gross negligence and reckless
negligence as is equivalent to such a wrong."' (quoting Seals v. St. Regis Paper Co., 236 So.2d
388, 392 (Miss. 1970))), andAnderson Living Tr. v. ConocoPhillips Co., 952 F. Supp. 2d 979,
1046 (D.N.M. 2013) ("New Mexico recognizes that, although punitive damages are not
normally available for a breach of contract, a plaintiff may recover punitive damages when a
defendant's breach was 'malicious, fraudulent, oppressive, or committed recklessly with a
wanton disregard for the plaintiff s rights."' (quoting Romero v. Mervyn's, 784 P.2d 992, 998
(N.M. 1989))), and Clark, 238 S.E.2d at 444 ("Even in an action for breach of contract, where
there were matters of record relating to fraud, punitive damages can be awarded, for '[f]raud,
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involving a tort, rather than a contract, the availability of this form of
damages in certain cases again demonstrates the complexity of
evaluating remedies in a breach of contract claim.8 3
Complicating the lore surrounding expectation damages even
further is that many statutes alter the recovery. For instance, some states
provide that the prevailing party may recover attorney's fees for a
breach of contract.8 4 "Little FTC" laws that have been enacted in states
across the country also provide for attorney's fees to a successful
plaintiff when deceptive conduct is involved," as well as treble
damages under certain circumstances.8 6 Finally, the Magnusson-Moss
Warranty Act, which applies to sales of consumer goods, provides for
attorney's fees when its provisions are violated."

if found, is tortious conduct."' (quoting Diana v. Monroe, 209 S.E.2d 70, 72 (Ga. Ct. App.
1974))).
83.

See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§

344 cmt. a (AM. LAW

1981); Id. ch. 16, topic 3, intro. note.
84. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01 (2019) ("In any contested action
arising out of a contract, express or implied, the court may award the successful party
reasonable attorney fees."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-308 (2019) ("In any civil action to
recover on. . . breach of contract, unless otherwise provided by law or the contract which is
the subject matter of the action, the prevailing party may be allowed a reasonable attorney's
fee to be assessed by the court and collected as costs."); 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-45 (2019)
("The court may award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party in any civil action
arising from a breach of contract in which the court: (1) Finds that there was a complete
absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the losing party; or (2) Renders a
default judgment against the losing party."); TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001
(West 2019) ("A person may recover reasonable attorney's fees from an individual or
corporation, in addition to the amount of a valid claim and costs, if the claim is for: ... an oral
or written contract.").
85. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-634(e)(1) (2019) (allowing the prevailing party of a
deceptive practices claim to receive reasonable attorney's fees); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
§ 17.50(d) (2019) (requiring the prevailing consumer to be awarded attorney's fees in actions
under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act); Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco
Title Ins., Co. 719 P.2d 531, 532, 534-35 (Wash. 1986) (recognizing an attorney fee award in
instances where the party prevails on proving the existence of an unfair or deceptive act).
86. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (allowing the trier of fact to award
up to three times the economic damages if the conduct of the defense was knowing or
intentional); Cheramie Servs., Inc. v. Shell Deepwater Prod., Inc., 09-1633, p.8 (La. 4/23/10),
35 So. 3d 1053, 1058 (noting a finding of knowing and deceptive conduct will result in an
award of attorney's fees and treble damages).
87.
If a consumer finally prevails in any action brought under the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, he or she may be allowed to recover "a sum equal to the aggregate amount of
cost and expenses (including attorneys' fees based on actual time expended)." Act of Jan. 4,
1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2191 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982)); see
INST.

JAMES J. WHrrE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§

10-18(c) (6th ed.

2010) (noting section 110 of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act gives the winning consumer
costs and expenses "including attorneys' fees based on actual time expended").
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In sum, I agree that the concept that the victim of a breached
contract will be put in the same position they would be in had the
breach not occurred is lore. However, this bit of lore is incomplete.
Contracts people understand that expectancy damages are just one of
the interests that the victim of a breach may seek to protect, and that
soft damages, and state and federal statutory schemes also must be
considered when evaluating contracts damages.
D.

Other Lore

Thus far I have described Professor Hillman's lore as lying on a
spectrum starting with the least lore-like in the importance of the
intention of the parties and ending with the concept that is most lorelike in expectancy damages. In the middle of this spectrum is the
concept that the reason for a breach is irrelevant, which I find to be
more of a half-truth. In More Contract Lore, Professor Hillman
identifies three more instances of contract lore. One is really just a
further example of where the parties' intentions are irrelevant, and that
is when courts attempt to "gap fill" contracts." The other two bits of
contract lore offered are that "promises are enforceable only if they are
supported by consideration," and "consumers consent to standard form
contracts."8 9 I believe these similarly fit along a spectrum of more or
less lore-like.
As gap-fillers are just a further example of the lore surrounding
intention of the parties, I would place this in the same category as the
least lore-like. While it is true that when parties leave gaps in their
contract, a court may be asked to fill them in ways that may not truly
reflect the intention of the parties (especially at the time litigation
arises),90 the gap-filling process is still designed to respect the
intentions of the parties by using a term that is "reasonable in the

Hillman, Lore II, supra note 3, at 908-10.
88.
Id. at 910-11, 906-07.
89.
See F.W.F., Inc. v. Detroit Diesel Corp., 494 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1359 (S.D. Fla.
90.
2007) ("Under 'general principles of contract law,' a failure to locate explicit contractual
language does not mark the end of proper judicial interpretation and construction." (quoting
Dobson v. Hartford Fin. Serys. Grp., Inc., 389 F.3d 386,399 (2d Cir. 2004))); Metro-GoldwynMayer, Inc. v. Scheider, 360 N.E.2d 930, 931 (N.Y. 1976) (holding that if a contract has been
formed, the court will enforce a missing provision by some objective manner irrespective of
either party's wish or desire); Gallagher v. Upper Darby Twp., 539 A.2d 463, 467, 473 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1988) (holding that the law of contracts will imply and enforce an obligation that
was either in the contemplation of the parties during negotiation or is necessary to carry out the
parties' intentions).
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circumstances." 9 ' When a dispute arises, each party is likely to
advocate for a gap-filler that benefits themselves.92 The challenge to the
court is to see beyond these self-interested arguments and try to discern
what the parties likely would have agreed upon when the contract was
formed.93
I believe consideration is similar to the lore regarding the reason
for the breach. It is true on a very basic level in that it separates purely
donative gifts from contracts and so the requirement for consideration
is not pure lore.94 However, the requirement can devolve rather quickly
given the right set of circumstances. For instance, in the context of
charitable gifts, some courts have found that a charitable organization's
agreement to restrict how it uses donated funds to be sufficient
consideration," or undertaking to get matching donations to be enough
to enforce the promise as a contract. 96 And of course, promissory
estoppel can always be asserted if a promise, though lacking
91.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 204 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
("Both the meaning of the words used and the probability that a particular term would have
been used if the question had been raised may be factors in determining what term is reasonable
in the circumstances."). The comments do go on to note that circumstances may arise where
no agreement was made, and then directs that "the court should supply a term which comports
with community standards of fairness and policy rather than analyze a hypothetical model of
the bargaining process." Id.
92. DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 263 (3d Cir. 2008) (arguing by a patient
that a provision in a hospital agreement to pay for services rendered was open-ended and thus
ambiguous); Fitzpatrick v. Teleflex, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 224, 234-35 (D. Me. 2011) (noting
one party argued that a missing term of duration of a contract created an ambiguity of a long
term contract, while the other party argued that the missing duration meant terminable at will);
F. W.F., Inc., 494 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 (arguing that a settlement agreement required one party
pay all the costs associated with the repairs to a boat "without limit" because the terms of the
settlement agreement did not specify a specific amount related to costs of restoring the boat as
agreed).
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 204 cmt. d ("Sometimes it is said that
the search is for the term the parties would have agreed to if the question had been brought to
their attention.").
94.
See Hillman,Lore II, supra note 3, at 910-11.
95.
See Trs. of Baker Univ. v. Clelland, 86 F.2d 14, 20 (8th Cir. 1936) (finding
consideration when a gift made to a college in exchange for an understanding that an honorary
Chair of the English Bible would be maintained in memory of the donee); Robinson v. Nutt,
70 N.E. 198, 198-99 (Mass. 1904) (finding consideration when a gift to a church was
conditioned on the church not incurring certain expenses and maintaining a budget which the
church relied upon and performed); Allegheny Coll. v. Nat'l Chautauqua Cty. Bank of
Jamestown, 159 N.E. 173, 176 (N.Y. 1927) (finding consideration where a promisor requested
that the gift be used as an endowment in memory of the promisor).
96. Robinson, 70 N.E. at 199 (holding a promise to match a charitable donation to a
parish as sufficient consideration to uphold the agreement to do so); Ladies' Collegiate Inst. v.
French, 16 Mass. (1 Gray) 196, 201 (1860) (determining a subscription to donate to a school
constituted a concurrent promise sufficient to make the promise binding).
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consideration, reasonably induces another to act to their detriment in
reliance on the promise.9 7 Thus, while there is some truth to the
statement that a contract requires consideration, contracts people
understand that context matters.
The strongest example of lore in this new trio is that consumers
actually consent to all of the terms in standard form contracts. Much
has been written on whether consumers actually read these termsthey don't-and whether they should be bound.9 8 But even this bit of
lore faces some push-back in the courts. Not all courts are willing to
enforce rolling contracts, particularly if there is no opportunity given to
object to the terms.9 9 Others rely on a lack of notice of the terms, such
as when an online merchant attempts to bind consumers to terms
through browsewrap terms."'o Other courts invoke section 211(3) of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 ("A promise which the promisor
97.
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third
person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice
requires."); LAURENCE P. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 61 (2d ed. 1965)
("Detrimental action or forbearance by the promisee in reliance on a gratuitous promise, within
limits constitutes a substitute for consideration, or a sufficient reason for enforcement of the
promise without consideration. This doctrine is known as promissory estoppel." (emphasis
added)).
98.

NANCY S. KiM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONs 57 (2013)

("Many commentators have written about the failure of consumers to read standard form
contracts."); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADmON: DECING APPEALS 370

(1960) ("Instead of thinking about 'assent' to boiler-plate clauses, we can recognize that so far
as concerns the specific, there is no assent at all.").

99.

See Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding

that simply keeping a computing for five days was insufficient to manifest an assent to
additional terms enclosed in a box ordered by the customer); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,

676 N.Y.S. 2d 569, 572 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that transactions involving "cash now terms
later" the contract terms do not become effective until the consumer has an opportunity to read

them); DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1071 (R.I. 2009) ("It is simply unreasonable to
expect a seller to apprise a consumer of every term and condition at the moment he or she
makes a purchase. A modem consumer neither expects nor desires to wade through such
minutia....").

100. See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 2014) ("But
the proximity [to the order button] or conspicuousness of the hyperlink alone is not enough to
give rise to constructive notice, and Barnes & Noble directs us to no case law that supports this

proposition."); Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 32 (2d Cir. 2002) ("We
conclude that in circumstances such as these, where consumers are urged to download free
software at the immediate click of a button, a reference to the existence of license terms on a
submerged screen is not sufficient to place consumers on inquiry or constructive notice of those

terms."); In re Zappos.com, Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 893 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1064
(D. Nev. 2012) ("The Terms of Use is inconspicuous, buried in the middle to bottom of every
Zappos.com webpage among many other links, and the website never directs a user to the
Terms of Use. No reasonable user would have reason to click on the Terms of Use, even those
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Restatement (Second) of Contractso' and strike terms that consumers
would not reasonably expect.10 2
E.

Is It Really All Aspirational?

Professor Hillman posits that one reason for the persistence of the
above lore is that it is aspirational, and "cognitive dissonance, which
constitutes the tendency of people to strive towards a consistency in
internal beliefs, which often leads them to believe things that are not
true and to avoid conflicting information." 0 3 In More ContractLore,
Hillman continues to point to cognitive dissonance as an explanation
for contract lore but acknowledges that although it "is part of the
mystery of contract lore, a one 'size fits all' explanation is
incomplete."" He then explores political and other more "benign"
explanations for lore, such as simplification of complex legal
principles. However, cognitive dissonance remains a central theme,
and one I would like to further explore before proposing my own
explanation for contract lore. 1
Professor Hillman posits that contract "lore" may be aspirational,
and what is driving its persistence is cognitive dissonance: "the
tendency of people to strive towards a consistency in internal
beliefs." 106 But, just as with the lore discussion, I believe the degree to
which these different observations are aspirational varies. The strongest
users who have alleged that they clicked and relied on statements found in adjacent links, such
as the site's 'Privacy Policy."').
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) ("Where the other party has
reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the
writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement."); id. § 211 cmt. d
("But baggage checks or automobile parking lot tickets may appear to be mere identification
tokens, and a party without knowledge or reason to know that the token purports to be a
contract is then not bound by terms printed on the token. Documents such as invoices,
instructions for use, and the like, delivered after a contract is made, may raise similar
problems.").
102. See Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 380 F. App'x 22,24 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that
an arbitration clause contained in the browsewrap "Terms and Conditions" hyperlink was not
sufficient to constitute notice sufficient for the consumer to assent to an arbitration clause
contained therein); Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 366-67, 404 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
(holding that where terms were not conspicuous through browsewrap, scrollwrap, and
clickwrap "[t]hey are not enforceable against ordinary consumers who are unlikely to be aware
of [the terms]"); Reedy v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 758 N.E.2d 678, 685 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001)
(holding when terms arrive after acceptance of a contract and without notice of material
changes to the contract, the new terms are not enforceable).
103.

HILLMAN, supra note 11, at 515.

104. Hillman, Lore II, supra note 3, at 915.
105. Id. at 911-23.
106.

Hillman, Lore I, supranote 1, at 515.
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statement of aspiration happens to be the one that is least lore-like and
that is the primacy the parties' intentions play in contract interpretation.
This seems to be the strongest statement of an agreed aspiration, and as
I have stated, the reliance on the objective theory is really just a means
by which we try to achieve this goal."o7 Hillman also points to freedom
of contract as an aspiration that explains some of the lore, such as the
myth that consumers consent to standard forms, and I agree that this
may be an explanation for the persistence of this particular bit of lore."
It is one that has come under harsh criticism, however, as Hillman
notes. 109 Given the criticism that contracts scholars have unleashed on
adhesive contracts, particularly in an online setting, I wonder whether
the modem use of "freedom of contract" is still an aspiration as it
appears to permit enforcement of terms without actual assent.1"0
Many of Hillman's other observations seem to arguably be even
less aspirational. For instance, the requirement that consideration be
present for a contract has certainly been questioned. It is defended on
grounds that it serves signaling functions in that consideration helps to
differentiate seriously taken promises from unenforceable gifts."'
Professor Lon L. Fuller also argued that the formal requirements of
consideration serve evidentiary functions in that it helps ensure a
promise was actually made.1 12 But other scholars have criticized its
importance, some arguing that consideration should merely be
evidence of consent, but not the sine qua non of a contract.113 And the
107. Craig Leonard Jackson, TraditionalContract Theory: Old and New Attacks and
Old and New Defenses, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 365, 367 (1999) ("In trying to discover the
identity of an individual's actions, we have to ponder the reasons behind the actions, which
means that we have to ponder what was in a person's mind at a given moment.").
108. Hillman, Lore II, supra note 3, at 914-15.
109. See id. at 913-14; Robin Bradley Kar & Margaret Jane Radin, Pseudo-Contract
and Shared Meaning Analysis, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1135, 1138-40 (2019) (distinguishing
"assimilationists"-who try to fit modem-day boilerplate terms into typical contract rules so
long as there is constructive notice of the terms-and the historical use of concepts of assent
and consent); see also Cheryl B. Preston & Eli McCann, Llewellyn Slept Here:A Short History
ofSticky Contracts andFeudalism,91 OR. L. REv. 129, 13842 (2012) (reviewing the historical
development of the term "freedom of contract" and concluding that the modem use of the term
is reminiscent of manorial systems in feudal England).
110. Preston & McCann, supranote 109, at 169.
111. See Lon L. Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800-01
(1941) (identifying both a cautionary and channeling function); Edwin W. Patterson, An
Apologyfor Consideration,58 COLUM. L. REv. 929,935-37 (1958); Mark B. Wessman, Should
We Fire the Gatekeeper? An Examination of the Doctrine of Consideration,48 U. MIAII L.
REV. 45,46 (1993).
112. Fuller, supra note 111, at 800-01.
113. See Wessman, supra note 111, at 68 ("The doctrines that correlate to these core
notions of agreement and promise are the various doctrines of assent, not the rules grouped
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mere existence of promissory estoppel as an alternate theory of
recovery when consideration is lacking would seem to be a recognition
that consideration should not be required in all cases to make a promise
enforceable.1 14
The observations that willfulness in contract breach is irrelevant
and that expectation damages should put the nonbreaching party only
in as good a position as they would have been had the other party not
breached have both come under attack."' The irrelevance of
willfulness has been attacked particularly in discussions regarding
efficient breach.116 Indeed, a handful ofjurisdictions briefly recognized

under the doctrine of consideration." (citations omitted)); see, e.g., Randy E. Bamett, A
Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLuM. L. REv. 269, 311-12 (1986) ("If it is widely known
that the written phrase 'in return for good and valuable consideration' means that one intends
to make a legally binding commitment, then these words will fulfill a channeling function as
well as, and perhaps better than, a seal or other formality. The current rule that the falsity of
such a statement permits a court to nullify a transaction because of a lack of consideration is
therefore contrary to a consent theory of contract."); Nathan B. Oman, Reconsidering
Contractual Consent: W1hy We Shouldn't Worry Too Much About Boilerplate and Other
Puzzles, 83 BROOK. L. REv. 215, 243 n.100 (2017) ("After more than a decade teaching
contract law, I can testify that the one rule of contract law that all IL students arrive at law
school knowing is that if you sign on the dotted line you are bound by the terms of the
agreement. The irony, of course, is that because of the doctrine of consideration the one rule
that everyone knows is wrong.").
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 90, 139 (AM. LAW INST. 1981);
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 16 (1981)

("An individual is morally bound to keep his promises because he has intentionally invoked a
convention whose function it is to give grounds-moral grounds-for another to expect the
promised performance."); Efi Zemach & Omri Ben-Zvi, Contract Theory and the Limits of
Reason, 52 TULSA L. REv. 167, 179 (2017) ("The convention of promising is, therefore, a
necessary device by which individuals meet goals and purposes by enlisting the collaboration
of other free persons.... At the same time, by forcing a promisor to keep her promise, we
respect her capacity as a free, rational, and autonomous moral agent." (citation omitted)).
115. Patricia H. Marschall, Willfulness: A Crucial Factor in Choosing Remedies for
Breach of Contract, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 733, 735 (1982).
116. See David W. Barnes, The Net Expectation Interest in Contract Damages, 48
EMORY L.J. 1137, 1164 (1999) ("[Mlost judicial references to efficient breach theory appear
in a second context, one in which the injured party is attempting to obtain more than full
compensation, usually through a claim for punitive damages for a willful breach."); Frank J.
Cavico, Jr., Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract-A Principled Approach, 22 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 357, 373-75 (1990) ("[Efficient breach theory] continually downplays or
disregards the wrongfulness of the breaching party's conduct regardless of how outrageously
immoral, offends one's sense of fairness and justice and engenders disrespect for the law.");
Marschall, supra note 115, at 734 (arguing the efficient breach theory "is faulty and that such
breaches should not be encouraged by the courts' use of remedial principles that allow the
willful breacher to profit from his breach"); Frank Menetrez, Consequentialism, Promissory
Obligation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 47 UCLA L. REV. 859, 882 (2000) ("If we
wish to take seriously the moral force of contracts as promises, then efficient breaches should
not be encouraged.").
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a claim for bad faith breach of contract in tort."1 I Though this cause of
action was short-lived, it demonstrates a dissatisfaction with a legal
regime that does not provide adequate relief when breach is willfil." 8
Expectation damages have been criticized as not an adequate interest
to protect, even if fully realized. Professor Richard Craswell
summarized Fuller and Perdue's three interests (expectation, reliance,
and restitution) as follows:
To most modem scholars (as to Fuller and Perdue), remedies can be
defended only by reference to some purpose or policy they might serve.
We might adopt broader or narrower remedies in order to create efficient
incentives, for example, or to achieve certain distributional goals, or to
affirm an important symbolic message. Under any of these approaches,
the analysis starts with the particular goal to be achieved--efficiency,
distribution, or what have you-and proceeds on that basis to decide
what remedy ought to be awarded. Under these approaches, then, there
is no reason to think that the remedy that best serves the chosen
substantive goal will necessarily coincide with one of Fuller and Perdue's
three "interests." Moreover, even when one of these approaches does
happen to coincide (in its recommended remedy) with one of those three
"interests," that coincidence will appear only at the conclusion of the
analysis: the particular "interest" that is selected will not have played any
role in the analysis leading up to that conclusion. There thus is no reason
to begin our analysis with Fuller and Perdue's three "interests," or to treat
those "interests" as key concepts of any sort.119
Relating these two observations, other scholars have argued that
punitive damages should be available in cases of willful breach.' 20
All of this isn't to say that the lore observations Professor Hillman
identifies are not aspirational to some group of contracts people-all
have their defenders and justifications. But given the debates over these
117. See Marschall, supranote 115, at 758-60.
118. See generally id
119. Richard Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. CH. L. REv. 99, 106-07
(2000).
120. See Cavico, supra note 116, at 444 ("Punitive damages are appropriate to address
willful, tort-like misconduct arising out of a breach of contract."); William S. Dodge, The Case
for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DuKE L.J. 629, 633 (1999) (arguing "on economic
grounds that punitive damages should be available for all willful breaches of contract,
including both opportunistic breaches and efficient breaches"); Marschall, supra note 115, at
759-60 ("Any breach of contract which is found to be willful and in unreasonable disregard of
the other party, should subject the breaching party to punitive damages." (citation omitted));
John A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive and NonpecuniaryDamages in Actions Based upon Contract:
Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1565, 1568-69
(1986) (noting that the strict limitation of punitive damages in contract cases contributes to the
undercompensation of contract plaintiffs).
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observations, calling them all aspirational doesn't seem a satisfying
explanation for their persistence. Indeed, some of the most lore-like
observations also seem to be some of the most criticized, which might
indicate that the departure in reality from the stated legal principle may
be the natural inclination of litigants and jurists to move toward
something more in line with the evolving aspirations of the contract
law community. In other words, the fact that these statements have
become lore may be evidence in-and-of-itself that these observations
are not aspirational.
III.

CONTRACT LORE AS HEURISTIC STARTING POINTS

As discussed above, I find a unifying explanation for the
persistence of lore as being attributable to cognitive dissonance
unsatisfying as I disagree that it is all aspirational. Instead, I would offer
that a more satisfying explanation is that the lore observations are really
heuristics or at least heuristic starting points. Each observation provides
a jumping off point for addressing a contract problem, be it by a
student, practitioner, or scholar. However, given that many of these
starting points are not all aspirational, it does beg the question, why are
these the starting points?
A.

A BriefExplanation ofHeuristics

In Professor Hillman's original article on contract lore, he
dismisses heuristics as an explanation, stating, "Because contract lore
is not always certain in application and often constitutes poor advice to
contracting parties, I also doubt that we can explain it as a set of
heuristics or shortcuts developed by transactional lawyers to simplify
advice to their clients."'2 1 This approach seems to treat heuristics as
merely legal macros, and if this were the only definition of a heuristic,
Professor Hillman would be correct.1 2 2 The contract lore he identifies
would be a poor macro as the end results are not uniform. 123 For this
essay, I am using a slightly different definition of a heuristic-one that
encapsulates the discernment that contracts people go through when
presented with a problem that is addressed by "lore."
Christopher Engel and Gerd Gigerenzer provide a broader
definition of heuristics than simply a shortcut.
121. Hillman, Lore I, supra note 1, at 514.
122. See id.
123. See id
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What is a heuristic? Why would anyone rely on heuristics? The term
heuristicis of Greek origin and means "serving to find out or discover."
In the title of his Nobel Prize-winning paper of 1905, Einstein used the
term heuristic to indicate an idea that he considered incomplete, due to
the limits of our knowledge, but useful. For the Stanford mathematician
Polya (1954), heuristic thinking was as indispensable as analytical
thinking for problems that cannot be solved by the calculus or probability
theory-for instance, how to find a mathematical proof.12 4
Applying heuristics in a law school setting, Robert Rhee, also drawing
upon Polya, describes heuristics as a framework "that puts the
classroom process into a larger structure of a problem-solving
process."1 25 As heuristics can also be explained as a framework for
solving problems, I would classify much of contract lore as part of this
framework-so perhaps it would be more accurate to label contract
lore as "heuristic starting points."
B.

ContractLore as Heuristic StartingPoints

I believe that a more satisfying explanation for contract lore is that
it aids the student, practitioner, or jurist to solve the problem at hand.
For instance, when an issue of contract interpretation arises, the starting
point is the "lore" that we give primacy to the intention of the parties.
This is the starting point. From there we proceed to answering the
question "what was the intention of the parties?" As all contracts people
know, to answer this we must first look to the objective manifestation
of their intentions, typically the express terms of the contract. 12 6 But we
don't stop there, as other contextual evidence may also affect this
analysis, such as course of performance, course of dealing, and trade

124. Christoph Engel & Gerd Gigerenzer, Law and Heuristics: An Interdisciplinary
Venture, in HEuRisTIcs AND THE LAW 2 (Christoph Engel & Gerd Gigerenzer eds., 2006).
125. Robert J. Rhee, The Socratic Method and the MathematicalHeuristic of George
P6lya, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 881, 883-85 (2007).
126. See Griesmann v. Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 776 F.2d 66, 72 (3d Cir. 1985)
("[T]rial courts are bound to interpret contractual terms to give effect to the parties' 'objective
manifestations of their intent' rather than attempt to ascertain their subjective intent. Only if
the terms used are ambigious [sic], or if the contract is not fully integrated, should the trial
judge allow the finder of fact to consider evidence that might vary or add to the contract's
express terms." (citations omitted)); Watkins v. Beatrice Cos., 560 A.2d 1016, 1020 (Del.
1989) ("Since the purpose of contract interpretation is to give effect to the express intent of the
parties, we begin our analysis of Beatrice's obligation with an examination of the express terms
of the Settlement."); Gene & Harvey Builders, Inc. v. Pa. Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co., 517 A.2d 910,
913 (Pa. 1986) ("The goal of [contract interpretation] is, of course, to ascertain the intent of the
parties as manifested by the language of the written instrument").
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usage,1 27 which are all to be read, when possible, as consistent with the
express terms.1 28 Even once an objective intent can be discerned,
contract law has developed numerous equitable outs for when a
contract is formed under suspicious circumstances such as fraud,
duress, or when a contract is found to be unconscionable.1 2 9
Similarly, contract people know that a contract requires
consideration to be enforceable, but that is just the beginning of the
analysis. If the case involves a charitable subscription, a court may be
more flexible with what counts as valid consideration, and if the
contract issue is an option contract, all that is necessary is "purported"
consideration.' Further, even if consideration is lacking, other
doctrines may provide an alternate avenue to relief for a plaintiff.
Promissory estoppel has been recognized by many courts as a
substitute for consideration.'' And if a contract were to fail, either
127. See U.C.C. § 1-303(d) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2011) ("A course of
performance or course of dealing between the parties or usage of trade in the vocation or trade
in which they are engaged or of which they are or should be aware is relevant in ascertaining
the meaning of the parties' agreement, may give particular meaning to specific terms of the
agreement, and may supplement or qualify the terms of the agreement."); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (stating that course of performance,
course of dealing, and trade usage may be used to aid interpretation of a contract); id. § 203(b)
("[E]xpress terms are given greater weight than course ofperformance, course of dealing, and
usage of trade, course of performance is given greater weight than course of dealing or usage
of trade, and course of dealing is given greater weight than usage of trade.").
128. See U.C.C. § 1-303(e) ("[T]he express terms of an agreement and any applicable
course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade must be construed whenever
reasonable as consistent with each other."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(5)
("Wherever reasonable, the manifestations of intention of the parties to a promise or agreement
are interpreted as consistent with each other and with any relevant course of performance,
course of dealing, or usage of trade.").
129. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 12, topic 1, intro. note.
130. See Merritt-Campbell, Inc. v. RxP Prods., Inc., 164 F.3d 957, 964 (5th Cir. 1999)
("To be binding, an option contract must: (1) be signed by the offeror; (2) recite a purported
consideration for making the offer; and (3) propose an exchange on fair terms within a
reasonable time." (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87)); Salsbury v. Nw. Bell
Tel. Co., 221 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1974) ("It is more logical to bind charitable subscriptions
without requiring a showing of consideration or detrimental reliance."); 1464-Eight, Ltd. v.
Joppich, 154 S.W.3d 101, 110 (Tex. 2004) (holding an option contract that recites purported
consideration is enforceable); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. f ("American
courts have traditionally favored charitable subscriptions and marriage settlements and have
found consideration in many cases where the element of exchange was doubtful or
nonexistent."); id. § 87 (emphasis added) ("(1) An offer is binding as an option contract if it
(a) is in writing and signed by the offeror, recites a purportedconsideration for the making of
the offer, and proposes an exchange on fair terms within a reasonable time.").
131. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 2009) ("In most states,
including Oregon, '""[piromissory estoppel" is not a "cause of action" in itself; rather it is a
subset of a theory of recovery based on a breach of contract and serves as a substitute for
consideration."' (quoting Rick Franklin Corp. v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp., 140 P.3d 1136,
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because no objective intent can be discerned or for lack of
consideration, unjust enrichment may provide relief 132
1140 n.5 (Or. Ct. App. 2006))); Vila v. Inter-Am. Inv. Corp., 570 F.3d 274, 279 (D.C. Cir.
2009) ("Promissory estoppel provides a party with a remedy to enforce a promise where the
formal requirements of a contract have not been satisfied, often serving as a substitute for one
of these formal requirements, usually consideration."); Middle E. Banking Co. v. State St.
Bank Int'l, 821 F.2d 897, 907 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Reliance is a necessary element of promissory
estoppel, which, in certain contexts, may serve as a substitute for consideration."); Platt Pacific,
Inc. v. Andelson, 862 P.2d 158, 167 (Cal. 1993) ("Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel,
the promise by one party and the resulting detrimental reliance on that promise by another party
operate as a substitute for consideration that may make the modification enforceable to the
extent necessary to prevent injustice."); Lord v. Souder, 748 A.2d 393, 400 (Del. 2000)
("Promissory estoppel is more accurately viewed as a consideration substitute for promises
which are reasonably relied upon, but which would otherwise not be enforceable.");
SilverWing at Sandpoint, LLC v. Bonner Cty., 435 P.3d 1106, 1118 (Idaho 2019)
("[P]romissory estoppel serves as a substitute for consideration in those circumstances when
the parties have a binding agreement, which otherwise would be unenforceable because of lack
of consideration."); Bank of Marion v. Robert "Chick" Fritz, Inc., 311 N.E.2d 138, 140 (Ill.
1974) ("[P]romissory estoppel . .. is usually considered as a substitute for consideration or an
exception to its ordinary requirements."); First Nat'l Bank of Logansport v. Logan Mfg. Co.,
577 N.E.2d 949, 954 (Ind. 1991) ("The doctrine of promissory estoppel can act as a substitute
for lack of consideration or lack of mutuality."); Kolkman v. Roth, 656 N.W.2d 148, 153 (Iowa
2003) ("[P]romissory estoppel is not only a substitute for consideration, but is also recognized
as an exception to the statute of frauds even in cases where the promise may be supported by
consideration."); Decatur Cty. Feed Yard, Inc. v. Fahey, 974 P.2d 569, 577 (Kan. 1999)
("Promissory estoppel developed as a substitute for consideration, which allowed a court to
enforce an otherwise unenforceable promise."); Chapman v. Bomann, 381 A.2d 1123, 1126
(Me. 1978) ("It has often been said that promissory estoppel is the principle by which contract
law avoids injustice through recognition of a substitute for traditional consideration.");
Vancheri v. GNLV Corp., 777 P.2d 366, 369 (Nev. 1989) ("The doctrine of promissory
estoppel, which embraces the concept of detrimental reliance, is intended as a substitute for
consideration, and not as a substitute for an agreement between the parties."); E. Providence
Credit Union v. Geremia, 239 A.2d 725, 727 (R.I. 1968) ("Traditionally, the doctrine of
promissory estoppel has been invoked as a substitute for a consideration, rendering a gratuitous
promise enforceable as a contract."); Duke Power Co. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 326 S.E.2d
395, 406 (S.C. 1985) ("The principle of promissory estoppel is viewed as a substitute for, or
an equivalent of, consideration."); Ravarino v. Price, 260 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah 1953)
("Promissory estoppel is historically rooted as a substitute for consideration.").
132. See Sherrill v. Frank Morris Pontiac-Buick-GMC, Inc., 366 So.2d 251, 257 (Ala.
1978) (allowing plaintiff to recover under the principle of unjust enrichment because she
believed she was contractually obligated to pay defendant when, in reality, she was not,
because their contract failed for lack of consideration); Uppal v. Waters, No. CV N16C-02047 EMD, 2016 WL 4211774, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 9, 2016) ("Unjust enrichment is an
altemative theory under contract law for when a party is unjustly enriched and there is no
contract that can be enforced as a remedy."); Associated Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Ruff, 424 P.3d
571, 595 (Mont. 2018) ("[Ulnjust enrichment applies in the contract context only when a party
renders 'a valuable performance' or confers a benefit upon another under a contract that is
invalid, voidable, 'or otherwise ineffective to regulate the parties' obligations."' (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 2(2) cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010)); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF RESTTrUTION § 31 ("(1) A person who renders performance under an agreement
that cannot be enforced against the recipient by reason of (a) indefiniteness, or (b) the failure
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In each of the above described instances, contract lore provides
the starting point to analyzing contract issues, but lore can also be used
to channel claims into other areas of law. For instance, if the basic
expectancy damages seem inadequate, a plaintiff can look to other
causes of action in tort.' 33 If a third party knowingly induced a breach,
tortious interference with contract may be available.' 34 If a faulty
product causes personal injury, products liability may be a superior
avenue than a pure contract claim."' Certain contracts may also give
rise to fiduciary duties,' 3 6 and though fraud is a defense in contracts, it
to satisfy an extrinsic requirement of enforceability such as [lack of consideration] has a claim
in restitution against the recipient as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.").
133. See Cavico, supra note 116, at 388.
134. See Hamann v. Carpenter, 937 F.3d 86, 90 (1st Cir. 2019) ("Under Massachusetts
law, a plaintiff bringing a claim of tortious interference with a contractual relationship must
prove that '(1) he had a contract with a third party; (2) the defendant knowingly interfered with
that contract .. .; (3) the defendant's interference, in addition to being intentional, was improper
in motive or means; and (4) the plaintiff was harmed by the defendant's actions."' (omission
in original) (quoting O'Donnell v. Boggs, 611 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2010))); Name.Space, Inc.
v. Internet Corp. for Assigned Names & Nos., 795 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2015) ("The
elements of a tortious interference with contract claim are: '(1) a valid contract between
plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant's knowledge of the contract; (3) defendant's
intentional acts designed to induce breach or disruption of the contract; (4) actual breach or
disruption; and (5) resulting damage."' (quoting Family Home & Fin. Ctr., Inc. v. Fed. Home
Loan Mortg. Corp., 525 F.3d 822, 825 (9th Cir. 2008)); Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown,
716 F.3d 342, 353-54 (4th Cir. 2013) ("To establish a claim for wrongful interference with a
contract, a plaintiff must demonstrate '(1) [t]he existence of a contract or a legally protected
interest between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the contract;
(3) the defendant's intentional inducement of the third party to breach or otherwise render
impossible the performance of the contract; (4) without justification on the part of the
defendant; (5) the subsequent breach by the third party; and (6) damages to the plaintiff
resulting therefrom."' (quoting Blondell v. Littlepage, 968 A.2d 678, 696 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2009))); Kirch v. Liberty Media Corp., 449 F.3d 388, 401 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Under New York
law, the elements of tortious interference with contract are (1) 'the existence of a valid contract
between the plaintiff and a third party'; (2) the 'defendant's knowledge of the contract'; (3) the
'defendant's intentional procurement of the third-party's breach of the contract without
justification'; (4) 'actual breach of the contract'; and (5) 'damages resulting therefrom."'
(quoting Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc., 668 N.E.2d 1370, 1375 (N.Y. 1996))).
135. See Donald J. Rapson, Products Liability Under ParallelDoctrines: Contrasts
Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RuT. L. REV. 692, 693
(1965) ("The doctrine of strict liability in tort ... render[s] outmoded the warranty aspects of
product liability law as governed by the Uniform Commercial Code.").
136. See, e.g., Karen E. Boxx, The DurablePower ofAttorney's Place in the Family of
FiduciaryRelationships, 36 GA. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (2001) (recognizing the durable power of
attorney as a contractual fiduciary relationship); Victor Brudney, Contractand FiduciaryDuty
in CorporateLaw, 38 B.C. L. REv. 595, 595 (1997) ("The concept 'fiduciary' . . has often
been said to be entailed in a large number of.. . contractual relationships, such as banks with
borrowers or depositors, franchisors with franchisees, licensors with licensees, and
distributorships."); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and FiduciaryDuty,
36 J.L. & EcoN. 425, 427 (1993) (describing the fiduciary relation as contractual); Larry E.

956

TULANE LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 94:925

is also a tort.137 All of these causes of action provide the opportunity to
claim punitive damages and therefore may represent a superior
recovery to a contract claim.138
In sum, contract lore can be viewed as starting points for a larger
analytical problem-solving framework. Contract lore may provide a
starting presumption from which the analysis begins. From there, the
student, practitioner, or jurist is expected to understand that additional
analyses may be required. The starting point may be incomplete, or
there may be an equitable response developed at law that provides
relief or an exception to relief. And at the end of the day, if contract law
is insufficient, other areas of law, such as tort, may provide relief.139
Along with providing a framework, contract lore's persistence
may be attributable to the need for contracts people to have a common
starting point. When contracts people sit down to negotiate a contract,
it is important that they have a shared understanding of how their words
and conduct will be viewed post hoc. As Professor Jeffrey Lipshaw has
noted:
The received wisdom among most academic theorists and "lawyers'
lawyers" is that rational actors will shape their voluntary agreements
before the fact in light of their expectation of how the system will resolve
disputes after the fact. The body of contract law propositions thus
provides a default reconstruction of the entire transactional lifecycle, but
it does so only through the lens of the after-the-fact adjudication that sets
the normative rules.1 4 0
Said another way, contract "lore" are the common sets of normative
rules that contracts people play by. Thus, not only are these heuristic
starting points important as a framework for problem-solving, but they
are also important because they are a shared framework amongst
contracts people.

Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899, 902 (2011) ("[O]ne becomes a
fiduciary only by contract .... .").
137.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS

§

9 (AM. LAW. INST., Tentative Draft No. 2,

2014) ("One who fraudulently makes a material misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention,
or law, for the purpose of inducing another to act or refrain from acting, is subject to liability
for economic loss caused by the other's justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation.").
13 8. Id.
13 9. Id.
140. Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Metaphors, Models, and Meaning in Contract Law, 116
PENN. ST. L. Rev. 987, 992 (2012).
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But Why Are These the StartingPoints?

While I believe that contract lore's persistence can be better
explained as heuristic starting points, a question still remains that is
related to Hillman's original essay-why are these the starting points?
As Hillman points out, many of the observations he labels as lore are
nowhere near accurate.14 1 As I've discussed above, though I think it is
more nuanced, I largely agree that there is a lore-like quality to many
of Hillman's observations. Hillman asks why we keep saying these
things if they are not true and offers cognitive dissonance as an
explanation.14 2 I offer an alternate explanation in heuristics, but must
admit that, while this may explain the persistence of lore, it doesn't
justify it. If the heuristic starting point is riddled with exceptions, and
is not aspirational, then why do we use these as the starting points at

all?
Perhaps the best explanation is that legal theories and rules are
sticky, i.e., once established they tend to persist even after they have
proven to make little sense. The Statute of Frauds is a good example of
this. The rule was carried over from Englandl43 and remains in the
United States even though it has been abolished in England.1" The
utility of the Statute of Frauds has come under attack as no longer
necessary'4 5 and is subject to exceptions such as the part performance

141.

Hillman, Lore I, supra note 1, at 518.

142. Id. at 515-17.
143. See Jennifer Camero, Zombieland: Seeking Refuge from the Statute of Frauds in

Contractsfor the Sale ofServices or Goods, 82 UMKCL. REv. 1, 2 (2013) ("England did enact
the Statute of Frauds in the late seventeenth century to combat the widespread problem of
perjury.").
144. Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2 c. 34, §2 (Gr. Brit.);
Statutes of Frauds-Partof English Act Repealed, 68 HARV. L. REV. 383, 383-84 (1954)
(recognizing Parliament repealed section four of the Statute of Frauds while the United States
has revised, rather than repealed, the provisions).
145. Hugh Evander Willis, The Statute ofFrauds-A Legal Anachronism, 3 IND. L.J.
427, 541 (1928) (outlining Professor Willis' 1928 argument that "the Statute of Frauds are no
longer preventing fraud" and that "[t]hey should be abolished," and further citing Professor
Holdsworth's concurrence with Professor Willis that the Statute of Frauds has "outlived its
usefulness").
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exception,14 6 promissory estoppel,' 4 7 and party admissions. 14 8 Yet the
rule remains. On a larger scale, classicism was a leading theory in
contract law throughout much of the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century before slowly being taken over and replaced by
legal realism.'4 9 But this trend took time and was aided by Karl
Llewellyn's influence in drafting the Uniform Commercial Code"'o and
146. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(a), (c) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2018); see also
Kalas v. Cook, 800 A.2d 553, 558 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (applying the UCC exception to the
Statute of Frauds for goods that are specially manufactured for a buyer under circumstances
that are reasonable for the seller to begin manufacturing and before repudiation by the buyer);

Morris v. Perkins Chevrolet, Inc., 663 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
under the UCC where there is no dispute as to quantity, partial payment validates an oral
contract so as to remove it from the Statute of Frauds); W.I. Snyder Corp. v. Caracciolo, 541

A.2d 775, 778 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) ("It is clear under the Code that partial payment will render
the contract enforceable with respect to the goods for which payment has been made.").

147. See Carl A. Haas Auto. Imps., Inc. v. Lola Cars Ltd., 933 F. Supp. 1381, 1390-91
(N.D. Ill. 1996) ("Illinois UCC-has expressly proclaimed 'that the statute of frauds is
applicable to a promise claimed to be enforceable by virtue of the doctrine of promissory
estoppel.' This Court accepts the quoted language as an accurate statement of current Illinois

law." (citations omitted)); Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co., 249 Cal. Rptr. 872, 87879 (Ct. App. 1988) (finding the majority rule of applying promissory and equitable estoppel to
oral contracts was the better rule to avoid an "unconscionable injury" to another who changed
their position to their detriment while relying on the oral promise of another); Adams v. Petrade

Int'l, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 696, 707 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a claim of promissory
estoppel may be asserted against the Statute of Frauds, but the requirements of estoppel must
be met as well as a "show[ing] that the promisor either misrepresented that the statute of frauds
had been satisfied, or promised to sign a written agreement").

148.

Synergistic Techs., Inc. v. IDB Mobile Commc'ns, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 24, 33

(D.D.C. 1994) (holding where the defendant's admission to a joint venture agreement was
sufficient to support an excuse of the Statute of Frauds and thus create an enforceable oral

contract); Garrison v. Piatt, 147 S.E.2d 374, 375 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) ("[T]he party charged
cannot admit the fact of the contract in the manner provided and at the same time claim the

benefit of the statute of frauds."); Dehahn v. Innes, 356 A.2d 711, 717 (Me. 1976) ("[The
ultimate goal of U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b)] is to limit the use of the statute of frauds as a shield
against unfounded fraudulent claims resting in parol, while removing from the arsenal of an

unscrupulous litigant an unrighteous defense against a just claim."); U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b).
149. Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 474 (1988)
("[Between 1920-1960,] legal realists wanted to replace formalism with a pragmatic attitude
toward law generally."); Brian Z. Tamanaha, UnderstandingLegal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV.

731 (2009) (discussing the emergence of legal realists as a challenge to the nineteenth century
legal formalist assumptions that had dominated legal philosophy); Hessel E. Yntema,
American Legal Realism in Retrospect, 14 VAND. L. REV. 317, 328 (1960) ("[The legal realist
movement is a] critical contemplation of doctrinal formulations that seemed no longer

appropriate.").
150.

Imad D. Abyad, Commercial Reasonableness in Karl Llewellyn's Uniform

Commercial Code Jurisprudence, 83 VA. L. REV. 429, 429 (1997) (discussing Llewellyn's
realist vision of law and commerce that led to the drafting of the U.C.C.); Karl Llewellyn, Why

a Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. L. REV. 779, 782 (1953) (discussing the need for a commercial
code as a critical response to making law for judges, instead of creating law to respond to the
needs of real world business); Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl
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E. Allan Farnsworth's influence as the reporter for the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts.' 51
Professor Hillman's observations, therefore, may simply be a
recognition that we need to reexamine some of these rules. If a rule is
littered with exceptions to the point that the rule is mostly lore, perhaps
it should not be a heuristic starting point. Further, if the starting point is
not aspirational, then there is little point in clinging to it, and a new
heuristic starting point should be established.
IV.

CONCLUSION

I am thankful to be invited to add my own observations to such a
fantastic topic. Professor Hillman's observation that contracts people
keep repeating things that we know aren't accurate calls into question
some long-standing and often-taught principles of contract law. While
I disagree with some of Professor Hillman's observations, it is more in
degree than an absolute opposition. Some of what Professor Hillman
labels lore, such as that we give primacy to the intention of the parties,
are truer than others, such as the statement that expectation damages
will put the aggrieved party in as good a position had the other party
not breached. Hillman offers as an explanation that contract lore are
really expressions of aspiration and that cognitive dissonance could
explain the persistence of lore. As with his lore description, I disagree
in degree and believe that while some statements may be strong
expressions of aspiration, others are not.
As an alternative, I believe that all of the observations made by
Professor Hillman can more easily be explained as heuristic starting
points. Heuristics provide a framework for problem-solving, and these
observations are simply a tool to assist contract people is solving
contracts problems. Not only are these observations important as
Llewellyn and the MerchantRules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465,466 (1987) (discussing Llewellyn's

central position in legal realism and his influence on the drafting of the Uniform Commercial
Code and his articles on sales).
151. Jean Braucher, E. Allan Farnsworthand the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1420, 1420 (2005) (memorializing Farnsworth's historic and invaluable
contribution to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts); Scott D. Gerber, An Ivy League
Mystery: The Lost Papers ofArthur Linton Corbin, 53 S.C. L. REv. 605, 612-13, 629 (2002)

(discussing Corbin's influence on legal realism, specifically Karl Llewellyn as a student and
Allan Farnsworth in his work on the Second Restatement); William Twining, "Looking Back
Will Still Keep Us Looking Forward":A Letterfrom Arthur Corbin to Soia Mentschikoff upon

the Death ofKarlLlewellyn, 27 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201, 204-07 (2015) (stating that Corbin's
influence on Llewellyn at Yale contributed significantly to Llewellyn's later work that

transformed legal philosophy).
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heuristic starting points, but also as shared starting points. Contracts
people understand when they enter into contracts what set of rules will
be used to interpret their words and actions post hoc. But though
heuristics may help explain the persistence of Hillman's "lore," it does
not justify it. Professor Hillman's observations call into question
whether these bits of "lore" should be used as starting points at all in a
legal analysis. The persistence of these as heuristic starting points may
only be due to how slowly the law changes, but when a heuristic
starting point is riddled with exceptions, and is of little aspirational
value, then perhaps it is time to reexamine its utility.

